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THE  TRANSATLANTIC  RELATION~HIP -- A lONG-TER~ PERSPECTIVE 
A  FEW  WEEKS  AGO  I  ~ADE  WHAT  SOME  WOULD  DESCRIBE  AS  THE 
MISTAKE  OF  THINKING  ALOUD  BEFORE  AN  AUDIENCE  ABOUT  SOME  OF  THE 
CHALLENGES  THE  TRANSATLANTIC  RELATIONSHIP  WILL  FACE  THROUGH  THE 
REST  OF  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY.  PRESS  REPORTS  THEN 
CHARACTERIZED  ~y  EXTE~PORANEOUS REMARKS  AS  CRITICAL  OF  OUR 
~ESTERN EUROPEAN  ALLIES,  WHICH  IN  TURN  LED  TO  A HOST  or  ADVERSE 
COMMENT  ON  MY  INTELLIGENCE,  JUDGMEN-T  AND  PATERNITY  BY  ANY 
NUMBER  OF  HIGH-RANKING  EUROPEAN  O;,~,ICIALS,  AND  EVEN  AN 
OPPOSITION  LEADER  OR  TWO.  IN  ONE  OF  THE  KINDER  COMMENTS,  li 
NONDE  REMARKED  THAT  I  DIDN'T  •rvEN  HAVE  THE  EXCUSE  OF  BEING  ONE 
OF  THE  CALIFORNIANS  ••• • 
So,  I  AM  HERE  TODAY  TO  TRY  AGAIN.  MY  PURPOSE  IS  TO 
EXAMINE  THE  CHALLENGES  -- AND  I  BELIEVE  THERE  ARE  SOME  -- TO 
THE  CONTINUANCE  OF  A STRONG  TRANSATLANTIC  RELATIONSHIP  OVER  THE 
COURSE  OF  THE  REMAINDER  or  THE  20TH  CENTURY.  IT  IS  NOT  MY 
THESIS  THAT  THE  UORTH  ATLANTIC  ALLIANCE  IS  NOW  IN  CRISIS.  IT 
1! MY  CONTENTION  THAT  THE  FINAL  15  YEARS  OF  THE  20TH  CENTURY 
WILL  BE  YEARS  OF  SUBSTANTIAL  -- PERHAPS  PROFOUND  -- CHANGE,  AND 
THAT  IT  IS  TIME,  NOW,  FOR  THOSE  WHO  BELIEVE  AS  I  DO  THAT  A 
STROHG  TRANSATLANTIC  PARTNERSHIP  WILL  REMAIN  ESSENTIAL  TO  THE 
MAINTENANCE  OF  PEACE  AND  STABILITY,  TO  BEGIN  TO  EXAMINE - 2 -
TOGETHER  WHAT  IS  LIKELY  TO  CHANGE  AND  HOW  BEST  TO  AD1UST  TO 
THOSE  CHANGES. 
THE  PROBLEM  AS  I  SEE  IT  IS  THIS:  THE  ATLANTIC  AlliANCE  IS 
AND  WILL  REMAIN  OUR  MOST·IMPORTANT  POLITICAL  AND  SECURITY 
I[!!RES1.  JET  IN  THE  COURSE  OF  THE  NEXT  DECADES,  OUR  GLOBAL 
FOREIGN  POliCy  IMpERATIVES  WILL  INCREASINGLY  DEMAND  OUR 
ATTENTION,  OUR  TIM~,  AND  OUR  IMAGINATION.  ~E CAN,  I  BELIEVE,  - --.. 
ASSUME  THE  CONTINUANCE  OF  AN  UNWAVERING  AMERICAN  COMMITMENT  TO 
( 
THE  DEFENSE  OF  EUROPE.  WE  CAN,  AS  WELL.  ASSUMt  A CONTINUATION 
OF  A EUROPEAN  COMMITMENT  TO  OUR  ALLIANCE  PARTNERSHIP.  BUT  WHAT 
WE  CANNOT  -- OR  AT  LEAST  SHOULD  NOT  -- ASSUME  IS  THAT 
J 
GOVERNMENTS  ON  EITHER  SIDE  O( THE  ATLANTIC  WILL  ALWAYS  READILY 
II  ADJUST  TO  CHANGING  CIRCUMSTANCtS.  AN  ADJUSTMENT  WILL  BE  "AD£. 
BUT  ITS  ADEOUACY  AND  THE  EASE  OF  THE  TRANSITION  WILL  DEPEND 
HEAVILY  ON  HOW  SOON  THE  ~EST  UNDERSTANDS  -- COLLECTIVELY 
THAT  WE  FACE  NEW  TIMES. 
LET  ME  ~TART  BY  DESCRIBING  A FEW  OF  THE  MAJOR  CHANGES  1 
SEE  TAKING  PLACE  IN  THE  COMING  YEARS.  SOME  ARE  SIMPLE  AND 
READILY  APPARENTt  OTHERS  NEITHER  SO  SIMPLE  NOR  SO  CLEARLY 
PERCEIVED.  DEMOGRAPHIC  CHANGES  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES,  FOR 
EXAMPLE.  ARE  EASILY  UNDERSTOOD.  WE  HAVE  HAD  A PACIFIC  COAST 
SINCE  1819,  AND  SINCE  OUR  FIRST  CENSUS  OUR  DEMOGRAPHIC  CENTER 
HAS  BEEN  SHIFTING  WESTWARD  -- A PROCESS  THAT  Will  CONTINUE,  AND - 3 -
CARRY  WITH  IT  A CONTINUING  SHIFT  IN  OUR  POLITICAL  CENTER  OF 
GRAVITY  AS  WELL.  YET  EVEN  THIS  fACT  DOES  NOT  fULLY  ILLUSTRATE 
THE  IHPORTANCE  OF  OUR  WEST  COAST.  CALIFORNIA,  fOR  EXAHPLE, 
WOULD  HAVE  ONE  Of  THE  WORLD'S  LARGEST  GROSS  NATIONAL  PRODUCTS 
WERE  IT  AN  INDEPENDENT  NATION.  GROWING,  DYNAMIC  CITIES  SUCH  AS 
los  ANGELES  AND  SAN  DIEGO,  THE  SAN  FRANCISCO  BAY  AREA,  SEATTLE 
AND  PoRTLAND  CHALLENGE  OR  SURPASS  THE  EAST  COAST  CITIES  Of  UEW 
YORK,  BOSTON,  PHILADELPHIA  AND  BALTIMORE  AS  COMMERCIAL  CENTERS. 
EOUALLY  CLEARLY.  IT  IS  LOGIGAl  THAT  OUR  WEST  COAST'S 
·, 
'  ECONOMIC  AND  COMMERCIAl  GROWTH  WOULD  INCREASE  THE  IMPORTANCE  TO 
US  OF  A PART  OF  THE  WORLD  THAT,  WITH  TOOAY'S  COMMUNICATIONS, 
LIES  VIRTUALLY  AT  OUR  DOORSTEP.  YET  THE  RECENT  HISTORY  OF 
PACIFIC  ECONOMIC  DYNAMISM  IS  BY  NO  MEANS  SIMPLY  AN  AMERICAN 
PHENOMENON.  ASIA'S  ECONOMIES  ARE  TODAY  AMONG  THE  WORLD'S  HOST  .. 
PROSPEROUS.  JAPAN'S  AUTOMOBILES,  STEEL,  AND  ELECTRONIC  600DS 
ARE  SOLD  THROUGHOUT  THE  WORLD.  DYNAMIC  MARKET  ECONOMIES  IN  THE 
ASEAU  COUNTRIES,  IN  SOUTH  KOREA.  TAIWAN,  AND  HONG  KONG  PRODUCE 
OUALITY  PRODUCTS  AT  PRICES  THAT  ASSURE  THEIR  ABILITY  TO  COMPETE 
IN  WORLD  MARKETS.  CHINA  OFFERS  A VAST  POTENTIAL  AS  IT  OPENS  ITS 
ECONOMY  TO  THE  WORLD. 
IT  IS  LITTLE  REMARKED,  BUT  NONETHELESS  A REMARKABLE  FACT 
THAT  SINCE  1978  WE  HAVE  TRADED  MORE  WITH  THE  PACIFIC  BASIN  THAN 
WITH  EUROPEa  IN  1982  THE  DIFFERENCE  AMOUNTED  TO  ABOUT  S13 - If  -
BILLION.  THE  AMERICAN  AND  JAPANESE  ECONOftiES  ACCOUNT  FOR  ABOUT 
~NE-THIRD OF  THE  WORLD'S  TOTAL  GROSS  NATIONAL  PRODUCT.  lAST 
YEAR,  JAPAN  WAS  THE  SECOND  LARGEST  BUYER  OF  AMERICAN  PRODUCTS 
(AFTER  CANADA)  -- AND  YET  ONLY  ONE  OF  SEVERAL  INCREASINGLY 
I"PORTANT  ASIAN  TRADING  PARTNERS. 
MOREOVER,  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN  ARE  EMERGING  -- FOR  -
THE  IMMEDIATE  FUTURE.  AT  LEAST  -- A~ THE  TWO  ftOST  SIGNIFICANT 
PLAYERS  IN  THE  FIELD  OF  HIGH  TECHNOLOGY  DEVELOPMtNT  -- A FIELD 
THAT  IS  LIKELY  TO  DEFINE  FAST-PACED  ECONOMIC  DEVELOP"ENT  AND 
PROSPERITY  IN  THE  YEARS  AHEAD.  As  WE  ENTER  THE  TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN  ARE  LIKELY  :o BE  EITHER  THE 
WORLD'S  flAJOR  ECONOMIC  COMPETITORS,  OR  IftPORTANT  ECONOMIC 
PARTNERS. 
WE  WILL  FACE  IN  THE  COMING  YEARS  THE  CHALLENGE  OF  CREATING 
AND  "AINTAININ6  INSTITUTIONAL  LINKS  WITH  ASIAN  FRIENDS 
APPROPRIATE  TO  THEIR  NEEDS  AND  TO  OURS.  THOSE  LINKS  Will  NOT 
BE  IDENTICAL  TO  THOSE  WE  FORGED  WITH  OUR  EUROPEAN  fRIENDS,  AS 
THEY  WILL  REFLECT  THE  DIFFERENCES  IN  THE  RELATIONSHIPS.  CLOSER 
TIIS  WITH  ASIA,  FOR  EXAMPLE,  CANNOT  DUPLICATE  OUR  BROAD. 
HISTORICAL  RELATIONSHIP  WITH  EUROPE.  BUT  OUR  INCREASINGLY 
SHARED  ECONOMIC,  POLITICAL  AND  SECURITY  CONCERNS  IN  ASIA  WILL 
ALMOST  CERTAINLY  BRING  WITH  THEM  THE  CREATION  Of~ 
INSTITUTIONAL  ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  DEALING  MORE  EFFECTIVELY  WITH 
THOSE  CONCERNS. • • • • • 
I  REMARKED  EARLIER  THAT  SOME  CHANGES,  SUCH  AS  THE 
DEMOGRAPHY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  ARE  EASILY  SEEN  AND  THEIR 
CONSEOUENCES  READILy'  UNDERSTOOD.  OTHERS  ARE  NOT  SO  READILy 
APPARENT.  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  TRANSATLANTIC  RELATIONSHIP  OVER 
THE  NEXT  15  YEARS,  FOR  EXAMPLE,  CAN,  AT  THIS  POINT,  BE  ONLY 
DIMLY  PERCEIVED. 
\, 
THE  UATO  ALLIANCE,  WHICH  NEXT  "ONTH  CELEBRATES  ITS 
THIRTY-FIFTH  BIRTHDAY,  HAS  ASSURED  "ORE  THAN  A GENERATION  OF 
PEACE  IN  EUROPE  -- ITSELF  A RARE  OCCURRENCE  IN  EUROPE'S  20TH 
CENTURY  HISTORY  -- BY  REMINDING  FRIENDS  AND  ADVERSARIES  ALIKE 
THAT  WE  WILL  CONSIDER  AN  ATTACK  ON  THE"  AS  AN  ATTACK  ON 
OURSELVES.  PRESIDENT  REAGAN  HAS  RECENTLY  REAFFIRMED  OUR 
COMMITMENT  BY  DEPLOYING  -- IN  CONCERT  WITH  OUR  ALLIES  A NEW 
GENERATION  OF  INTERMEDIATE  NUCLEAR  "ISSILES  THAT  WILL  COMPLETE 
THE  CHAIN  OF  DETERRENCE  AND  ENSURE  THAT  WESTERN  EUROPE'S 
SECURITY  WILL  REMAIN  COUPLED  TO  OUR  OWN. 
I  NEED,  HERE,  TO  UNDERLINE  THAT  AMERICAN  RECOGNITION  THAT 
DEFENDING  WESTERN  EUROPE  IS  ALSO  THE  DEFENSE  OF  OUR  OWN  COUNTRY 
HARKED  A REVOLUTIONARY  CHANGE  IN  OUR  FOREIGN  POLICY.  IT  WAS - 6  -
NOT,  AT  FIRST,  A PREHISE  WITH  WHICH  AMERICANS  WERr  ENTIRELY 
COMFORTABLE.  fOR  ttANY,  LIKE  ttYSELF,  &ROWING  UP  IN  THE  MIDDLE 
WEST,  IT  IRREVOCABLY  EXTENDED  OUR  DESTINIES  AND  OUR  SENSE  OF 
PERSONAL  AND  NATIONAL  SECURITY  FAR  BEYOND  OUR  NATURAL 
\
FRONTIERS.  THIS  PREHISE  HAS  PROVED  TO  BE  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  LINK 
BETWEEN  THE  UNIT~D STATES  AND  EUROPE. 
THERE  HAVE  BEEN  PERIODIC  CRISES  IN  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE 
AlLIANCE  OVER  HOW  TO  ENHANCE  OUR  MUTUAL  SECURITY&  THERE  WILL 
ASSUREDLY  BE  ttORE  IN  THE  FUTURE.  WE  PUY  DISA·6REE  WITH  SOME  OF 
OUR  EUROPEAW  ALLIES  ON  PRECISELY  HOW  TO  COUPLE.~R REINFORCE 
THIS  BOND  -- BUT  THE  ESSENTIAl  PREMISE  THAT  PEACE  IN  THE 
WESTERN  WORLD  IS  INDIVISIBLE  HAS  NEVER  COME  INTO  QUESTION.  AND 
NO  INSTALLATION  OF  ANY  WEAPONS  SYSTEM  CAN  BE  A SUBSTITUTE  FOR 
THAT  FUNDAMENTAL  ASSUMPTION. 
YET  EUROPE'S  IMPORTANCE  TO  US  GOES  BEYOND  OUR  SECURITY 
\I  NEEDS  ALONE.  WE  ALSO  SHARE  A CULTURE.  A HISTORY  AND  SEVERAL  Of 
THEIR  LANGUAGE~  IDEAS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC  SO  QUICKLY  IN  BOTH 
DIRECTIONS  THAT  IT  IS  DIFFICULT  TO  FATHOM  FROM  W~ICH SIDE  THEY 
ORIGINATED. 
FINALLY.  THERE  IS  THE  POLITICAL  ASPECT  OF  OUR 
TRAN~ATLANTIC CULTURE.  OUR  SYSTEMS  OF  GOVERNMENT  MAY  VARY,  BUT 
WE  JOIN  THE  NATIONS  Of  WESTERN  EUROPE  IN  DEDICATION  TO  LIBERAL - 7  -
·~E"OCRATIC PRINCie.J_ES  THAT  EN~URE THE  FREEDOM  AND  DIGNITY  OF 
THE  INDIVIDUAL,  AND  60VERN"ENT  ON  THE  BASIS  OF  POPULAR 
CONSENT.  WE  INHERITED  THESE  VALUES  FROM  WESTERN  EUROPE,  AND  WE 
HAVE  CONTRIBUTED  HEAVILY  TO  THEIR  SURVIVAL  AND  VIABILITY  IN  AN 
OFTEN.HOSTILE  WORLD. 
EUROPE  AND  EUROPEANS  HAVE  HAD,  AND  STILL  HAVE,  A HAJOR 
IHPACT  ON  OUR  POLITICAL  THINKING.  HERE  WE  RETURN  TO  THE 
IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  TRANSATLANTIC  DlALOGUE.  ALTHOUGH  OUR 
' 
DIPLOMACY  WILL  NEVER  CO"PLETELY  S'~TISFY  OUR  EUROPEAN  FRIENDS 
ANY  MORE  THAN  IT  Will  EVER  SATISFY  OURSELvES.  EUROPEAN - ,. 
INFLUENCE  ON  OUR  FOREIGN  POLICY  HAS  BEEN  FAR  MORE  IMPORTANT -
THAN  IS  COMMONLY  PERCEIVED.  IT  HAS,  ON  THE  WHOLE,  LED  OVER  THE 
!"....,...7!'  'jrs  YEARS  TO  A FAR  MORE  NUANCED,  FAR  MORE  SOPHISTICATED  APPROACH  ON 
~~t~.J  OUR  PA.RT  THAN  WOULD  HAVE  BEEN  THE  CASE  WERE  WE  LEFT  STRICTLY  TO 
~·~ t~  OUR  OWN  DEVICES.  IT  IS  AN  INFLUENCE  THAT  HAS  BEEN  "OST 
~  f.-.  "r- ~  '  • 
1  EFFECTIVELY  EXERCISED  BEHIND  CLOSED  DOORS  -- IN  THE  t~ATO 
COUNCIL,  AT  THE  ANNUAL  7 NATION  SUMMITS,  IN  THE  CONSTANT 
MEETINGS  BETWEEN  AMERICAN  PRESIDENTS  AND  EUROPEAN  LEADERS,  AND 
IN  THE  HOST  OF  MEETINGS  BETWEEN  AMERICAN  AND  EUROPEAN  OFFICIALS 
THAT  TAKE  PLACE  ON  ALMOST  A DAILY  BASIS.  IT  IS  A PROCESS  THAT 
HAS  WORKED  BECAUSE  WE  HAVE  OPERATED  FROM  A BASIS  OF  SHARED 
VALUES  AND  OBJECTIVES,  COMMON  INTERESTS  AND  HOPES,  AND  "UTUAL 
DANGER  AND  SACRIFICE~ - B -
THIS  IS  PRECIOUS  CAPITAL  -- AN  UNPRECEDENTED  RESOURCE  OF 
THE  TRANSATLANTIC  PARTNERSHIP  WHICH  AMERICANS  AND  EUROPEANS 
ALIKE  "UST  SEEK  TO  PRESERVE  FOR  THE  GENERATIONS  YET  TO  COME. 
AND  SINCE  I  BELIEVE  WE  HAY  RUN  THE  RISK,  IN  THE  DECADES  OF  THE 
l} 
'80s  AND  '90s.  OF  LOSING  SOH£  OF  THAT  INTIMACY,  NOW  IS  THE  TIME 
TO  LOOK  TO  PRESERVING  IT.  I  SAY  •now,•  SINCE  THE  ALLIANCE,  AS 
I  INDICATED  EARLIER,  IS  NOT  TODAY  IN  A STATE  or  CRISIS. 
INDEED,  THE  CONTRARY  IS  TRUEa  WE  HAVE  SURVIVED,  OVERCOHE,  AND 
RESOLVED  MOST  OF  THE  DIFFICULT  ISSUES  BETWEEN  US  DURING  THE 
PAST  YEAR,  AND  THE  CLIMATE  or  RELATIONS  TODAY  IS  WARM  AND 
WORKMANLIKE. 
So  LET  ME  TAKE  THIS  TI~E  OF  RELATIVE  CALM  IN  THE  ALLIANCE 
TO  TEll  YOU  OF  THE  PROBLEMS  I  SEE  AHEADa  PROBLEMS  WHICH  IF  lEFT 
TO  EVOLVE,  UNPERCEIVED  AND  UNTENDED,  HAY  GROW  IN  COMPLEXITY  AND 
CONSEQUENCE. 
THIRTY  YEARS  AGO  ATLANTICISTS  FORESAW  A UNITED  EUROPE 
OVERCOMING  ITS  AGE-OLD  DIVISIONS  TO  PLAY  A GLOBAL  ROLE  NEAR  IF 
NOT  EQUAL"  TO  THAT  OF  THE  SUPERPOWERS.  ~ESTERN EUROPE'S 
COMBINED  POPULATION  EXCEEDED  OURS,  AND  THAT  OF  THE  SOVIET 
UNION.  ITS  REBUILT  INDUSTRIAL  BASE  WOULD  UNDERWRITE  ITS 
PROSPERITY•  ITS  POLITICIANS  AND  INTELLECTUALS  APPROACHED  THEIR 
PROBLEMS  WITH  CONFIDENCE  AND  IN  A SPIRIT  Of  BUILDING  A NEW  AND 
DIFFERENT  EUROPE.  AMERICANS,  ALTHOUGH  A BIT  WARY  PERHAPS  OF - 9 -
THIS  E"ERGING  GIANT.  WELCO"ED  RENEWED  WESTERN  EUROPEAN 
PROSPERITY  AND  THE  PROSPECT  OF  ITS  LARGER  INVOLVE"ENT  IN  WORLD 
AffAIRS,  BECAUSE  WE  KNEW  WE  HELD  NO  "ONOPOLY  ON  WISDOM  AND 
BECAUSE  WE  SHARED  WITH  WESTERN  EUROPEANS  COMMON  VALUES  AND 
OBJECTIVES.  MUCH  MORE  JOINED  THAN  DIVIDED  US. 
TODAY,  HOWEVER,  WE  &EE  A EUROPE  THAT  HAS  BECOME  LESS 
#  ~ 
CERTAIN  OF  ITS  fUTURE,  "ORE  UNCERTAIN  ABOUT  THE  WISDOM  OF 
'POST-WAR  POLICIES,  "ORE  FOCUSSED  ON  ITS  OWN  PROBLEMS  AND 
\THEREFORE  LESS  PREPARED  TO  LOOK  AT  THE  WORlD  WWQLE.  IN 
ADDITION,  A GOODLY  PORTION  Of  [UROP.J'S  YOUNGER  GENERATION 
APPARENTLY  INCREASINGLY  OUESTIONS  THE  UTILITY  OF  "ANY  OF  THE 
INSTITUTIONS  AND  INSTRU"ENTALITIES  THAT  HAVE  BEEN  SO 
FUNDAMENTAL  TO  THE  ATLANTIC  ALLIANCE. 
THE  UNITED  STATES  HAS  BEEN,  FOR  "ORE  THAN  A GENERATION  OF 
EUROPEANS,  THE  LAND  OF  DREAMS,  OF  ACHIEVING  THE  IMPOSSIBLE.  IT 
REMAINS  SO  TODAY,  FOR  MANY.  BUT  IT  IS  PROBABLY  ALSO  TRUE  THAT 
THERE  IS  A LEVEL  OF  DISILLUSIONMENT  AND  BITTERNESS  -- "OST 
CLEARLY  EVIDENT  AMONGST  THE  YOUNG-- BECAUSE  NEITHER  AMERICA, 
IN  PARTICULAR,  NOR  WESTERN  INSTITUTIONS  IN  GENERAL,  HAVE  BEEN 
ABLE  TO  FULFILL  All  THOSE  HOPES  AND  DREAMS.  AND  PERHAPS  MOST 
"7 
'h~~:> UNFORTUNATE,  THIS  DISILLUSIONMENT  SOMETIMES  GOES  BEYOND  THE  ,:,-..N'""-1'.. 
YOUNG  -- TO  NOT  SO  YOUNG  LEADERS  WITH  ENOUGH  EXPERIENCE  TO  KNOW 
BETTER. -- ---------------------
.. 
..  10  .. 
THIS  BITTERNESS  AND  DISILLUSION  IS.  TO  SOME  DEGREE,  TRUE 
ON  BOTH  SIDES  OF  THE  ATLANTIC.  Too  OFTEN  POLITICAL  PARTIES  OUT 
OF  OFFICE  TEND  TO  TAKE  POLITICAL  STANCES  ON  FOREIGN  POLICY  THAT 
THROW  INTO  THE  PERENNIAL  DEBATE  THE  OUESTION  OF  CONSISTENCY  ON 
ONE  SIDE  OF  THE  ATLANTlC  OR  THE  OTHER.  IT  IS.  HOWEVER,  SOME 
CONSOLATION  TO  REALIZE  THAT  WHEN  POLITICAL  •ours•  BECOME  THE 
POLITICAL  •xNs.•  THEY  HAVE  TENDED  TO  COME  TO  GRIPS  WITH  REALITY 
AND  REAFFIRM  THE  OVER-RIDING  IMPERATIVES  OF  THE  ATLANTIC 
ALLIANCE. 
WHILE  IT  CAN,  THEREFORE,  BE  ARGUED  THAT  ~1  CONCERNS  ABOUT 
THE  ATTITUDES  OF  EUROPEAN  YOUTH  AND  THE  VAGARIES  OF  OPPOSITION 
POLITICAL  LEADERS  CAN  BE  OVERDONE  -- SINCE  THE  PROCESS  OF  AGIN6 
AND  THE  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  POWER  TEND  TO  CHANGE  PERSPECTIVES 
-- IT  IS  LESS  EASY  TO  PUT  ASIDE  CONCERNS  ABOUT  WHAT  I  SEE  AS 
CHANGING  TRANSATLANTIC  PERCEPTIONS  OF  THE  WORLD  SCENE. 
I  HAVE  OFTEN  DISCUSSED  WITH  EUROPEAN  FRIENDS  THE  DIFFERENT 
I 
REQUIREMENTS  FOR  A NATION  WITH  GLOBAL  RESPONSIBILITIES  TO  THOSE 
WlTH  HO~E- REGIONAL  CONCERNS.  AND  THE  USE  OF  THE  WORD  GLOBAL  IS 
NOT  MEANT  IN  ANY  ARROGANT  FASHION.  NOR  IS  IT  TO  DENY  THE 
INTERESTS  THAT  SEVERAL  EUROPEAN  NATIONS  RETAIN  IN  AREAS  OF  THE 
WORLD  BEYOND  THEIR  CONTINENT.  BUT  THE  SHEER  SCOPE  OF  AMERICAN 
INTERESTS  ENGAGES  US  IN  A DIFFERENT  SET  OF  PERSPECTIVES  AND 
I"PERATIVES.  I  AM  PERSUADED  THAT  DESPITE  PERIODIC 
INCONSISTENCIES  (MAINLY  ON  OUR  PART)  AND  EVEN  AORE  FREOUENT - 11  -
CRISES  OF  POLICY  DISAGREEHENT  (E"ANATING  FREOUENTLY  FROH  THE 
l EUROPEAN  SIDE),  "EHBERS  OF  THE  ALLIANCE  CAN  STILL  FORGE  A 
l STRONG  coNSENsus  oN  "osT  Issurs or  IHPORTANCE.  As  THE  WARSAW 
PACT  SO  CLEARLY  DEMONSTRATES,  PARTNERSHIP  WITHOUT  VISIBLE 
DIFFERENCES  IS  NOT  A PARTNERSHIP  OF  EOUALS1  NOR  IS  IT  A 
PARTNERSHIP  THAT  POSSESSES  THE  DYNAMIC  OUALITIES  SO  NECESSARY 
TO  HAKING  THE  REOUIREO  AOJUSTHENTS  TO  CHANGING  CIRCUMSTANCES. 
BUT  AN  ALLIANCE  IN  WHJCH  THERE  IS  AN  EROSION  OF  UNDERSTANDING 
" 
OF  THE  REASONS  FOR  THOSE  DIFFERENCES  -- INCLUDING  MOST 
PARTICULARLY  A TOLERANCE  OF  THE  NECESSITIES  OF  GEOGRAPHY  AND 
\ 
II 
RESPONSIBILITY  -- CANNOT  BE  COUNtED  UPON  TO  RETAIN  TODAY'S 
VIGOR  IN  THE  FACE  OF  TOMORROW'S  CHALLENGES.  . 
EUROPEANS  OFTEN  ARGUE  -- AND  THEIR  POINT  IS  WELL  TAKEN 
THAT  DETENTE  HAS  BEEN  LARGELY  SUCCESSFUL  IN  ITS  EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT.  AND  IT  IS  CERTAINLY  CLEAR  TO  AAERICANS  THAT  TENSIONS 
IN  THE  HEART  OF  EUROPE  -- WITH  BERLIN  AS  BUT  ONE  EXAMPLE 
HAVE  LESSENED  SIGNIFICANTLY.  NOR  CAN  WE  LIGHTLY  IGNORE 
EUROPEAN  EFFORTS  TO  BRIDGE  THE  ECONOMIC,  POLITICAL  AND  CULTURAL 
DIVISION  OF  [UROPE  -- AND  HOW  CRUCIAL  THEY  BELIEVE  THESE 
EFFORTS  TO  BE  TO  THEIR  LONG  TERM  VISION  OF  THE  SECURITY  OF 
WESTERN  EUROPE. 
BUT  THESE  CONSIDERATIONS  ARE  -- AND  MUST  BE  -- ONLY  SOME 
OF  THE  ELEMENTS  IN  THE  AMERICAN  POLICY  FRAMEWORK.  WE  SEE ·----- . 
.  • 
- 12  -
EAST-WEST  RIVALRY  IN  A BROADER  CONTEXT.  EVEN  A CURSORY  STUDY 
OF  RECENT  EVENTS  IN  AFGHANISTAN,  THE  MIDDLE  EAST,  SOUTHERN 
AFRICA  OR  lATIN  AMERICA  PERSUADES  US  THAT  DETENTE  HAS  NOT  BEEN 
A SUCCESS  IN  AREAS  OUTSIDE  OF  EUROPE.  fROM  OUR  tERSPECTIVE, 
THE  SOVIET  ROLE  IN  THESE  AREAS  HAS  NOT,  TO  PUT  IT  "ILDLY, 
CONTRIBUTED  TO  STABILITY. 
fROH  THE  MANY  CONVERSATIONS  I  HAVE  HAD  WITH.EUROPEANS 
DISCUSSING  OUR  RESPECTIVE  VIEWS  OF,  AND  RELATIONS  WITH  THE 
SOVIET  UNION,  I  HAVE  NOT  FOUND  THEM  TO  BE  I&NqRANT  OF,  OR 
PREPARED  TO  IGNORE,  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  SOVIET  SY~TEH.  THERE  IS  .. 
OFTEN,  HOWEVER,  A BROAD  GAP  IN  OUR  EVALUATION  OF  THE  SOVIET 
< 
THREAT.  THERE  IS  BASIC  AGREEMENT  WITHIN  THE  ALLIANCE  ON  THE 
AVOIDANCE  OF  WARa  THERE  ARE  DIFFERENT  AND  DIFFERING  VOICES  IN  -
AND  WITHIN  THE  EUROPEAN  MEMBERS  OF  THE  ALLIANCE,  ON_PRECISELY 
HOW  TO  REDUCE  THE  LEVEL  OF  TENSIONS.  THESE  DISAGREE"ENTS  CAN 
SERVE  EITHER  TO  POLARIZE  OUR  POSITIONS,  OR  AS  AN  EXA"PLE  OF  HOW 
ALLIANCE  DIFFERENCES  CAN  BE  CONTAINED  WITHIN  A UNIFIED  POLICY. 
IF  THEY  ARE  TO  SERVE  THE  LATTER  PURPOSE  IT  WILL  BE  NECESSARY 
FOR  BOTH  EUROPEANS  AND  AMERICANS  TO  RECOGNIZE  THAT  THERE  ARE 
LEGITIMATE  REASONS  OF  GEOGRAPHY  AND  RESPONSIBILITY  THAT  WILL 
OFTEN  REOUIRE  NUANCED  DIFFERENCES  OF  APPROACH  TOWARD  THE  SAHE 
GENERAL  GOALS. 
OTHER  KINDS  OF  TRANSATLANTIC  DIFFERENCE,  UNFORTUNATELY, 
LEAVE  "ORE  BRUISED  FEELINGS  -- AND  PERHAPS  DEMONSTRATE  THE .  •. 
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DEGREE  TO  WHICH  WE  AND  OUR  £UROPiAN  ALLIES  HAVE  BEGUN  TO 
DIVERGE  ON  BASIC  ISSUES.  TWO~TEARS AGO  THE  BRITISH  EffORT  TO 
l 
REGAIN  THE  FALklAND  ISLANDS  POSED  fOR  THE  UNITED  STATES  A "ORE 
DIFFICULT  CHOICE  THAN  ~OST EUROPEANS  YET  RECOGNIZE.  YET  WE 
MADE  OUR  CHOICE.  A fEW  "ONTHS  AGO  I  HAD  REASON  TO  RE"EMBER 
THAT  DECISION  WHEN  WE  LEARNED,  WITH  PROfOUt.O  REGRET,  THAT  AS 
OUR  MARINES  LANDED  IN  GRENADA,  OUR  EUROPEAN  FRIENDS  "OVED 
SWIFTLY  AND  PUBLICLY  TO  CONDEMN  THE  ACTION.  THAT  EUROPEANS 
VIEW  THE  LIBERATION  OF  GRENADA  WITH  LESS  ENTHUSIASM  THAN 
AMERICANS  OR  GRENADIANS  DO,  IS,  l, kDHIT,  fULLY  WITHIN  THE 
'  ~ 
NORHAl  AND  ACCEPTABLE  RANGE  Of  ALLIANCE  DIFFERENCES.  BUT 
l
'/'wHERE,  AT  THAT  MOMENT,  WAS  THE  ALLIANCE  SOLIDARIT~ THAT  HAD 
I  MEANT  so  MUCH  TO  us  A YEAR  EARLIER?  ~HERE  WAS  THE  RECOGNITION 
THAT  THE  UNITED  STATES  "IGHT  BE  JUSTIFIED  IN  MOVING  TO  PROTECT 
WHAT  IT  BELIEVED  TO  BE  ITS  NATIONAL  INTERESTS?  AT  THE  VERY 
-~~I LEAST.  CouLD  NOT  ouR  FRIENDS  HAVE  susPENDED  1UD6HENT  uNTIL  THE 
EMERGING  SITUATION  BECAME  CLEARER?  . 
IN  THE  CASE  OF  GRENADA  WE  MOVED  IN  CONCERT  WITH  CARIBBEAN 
NATIONS  WHO  RECOGNIZED  THE  THREAT  TO  THEIR  OWN  SECURITY  THAT 
THE  REGIME  IN  GRENADA  POSED.  THE  UNITED  STATES  HAS.  SINCE  THE 
CLOSE  OF  ~ORLD WAR  II.  GROWN  INCREASINGLY  CONSCIOUS  OF  THAT 
CURSE  OF  All  GREAT  POWERS  -- UNILATERALISM  -- AND  HAS  SOUGHT 
'  TO  RESIST  ITS  TEMPTATIONS.  WE  LONG  AGO  DISCOVERED  THAT 
\  THERE  IS  A VERY  FINE  LINE  BETWEEN  UNILATERALISM ... 
- ~~ -
1 
ON  THE  ONE  HAND  AND  LEADERSHIP  ON  THE  OTHER,  AND  HAVE  TRIED 
VERY  HARD  TO  AVOID  THE  ONE  AND  [~BRACE THE  OTHER.  BUT  THE 
DISTINCTION  BECO"ES  INCREASINGLY  HARD  TO  "AINTAIN  WHEN  OUR 
PRINCIPAL  FRIENDS  AND  ALLIES  DO  NOT  RECOGNIZE  THAT  THE  BREADTH 
OF  OUR  INTERESTS  SO"ETI"ES  LEADS  US  TO  A DIFFERENT  EVALUATION 
OF  THREATS  TO  THOSE  INTERESTS  THAN  IS  HELD  BY  OTHERS. 
• • • • • 
THE  PRI"E  MINISTER  OF  THE  YOUNGEST  DEMOCRACY  IN  EUROPE, 
FELIPE  GONZALEZ  OF  SPAIN.  RECENTLY  TOUCHED  UPON-ANOTHER, 
RELATED,  PROBLE"  THAT  HAS  COME  TO  CONCERN  SO"E  AMERICANS  OF 
LATE.  •soMETI~Es•  HE  SAID,  .•wr,  THE  SPANISH,  HAVE  THE  FEELING 
THAT  WE  TRUST  ~ORE  IN  THE  DESTINY  OF  EUROPE  THAN  OTHER 
COUNTRIES  ALREADY  INTEGRATED  INTO  THE  GROUP  OF  EUROPEAN 
INSTITUTIONs.•  •THE  FACT  Is,•  HE  ADDED,  •tHAT  TO  A LARGE 
1\ EXTENT  EUROPE  TODAY  RE"AINS  OBSESSED  WITH  ITS  OWN  PROBLE"S, 
\THIS  IS  SOMETHING  THAT  NEEDS  TO  BE  OVERCOME.• 
THE  DANGER  WITH  THIS  GROWING  TENDENCY  TO  LOQK  INWARD 
IS  THAT  IT  MAY  REENFORCE  THE  POTENTIAL  NEGATIVE -------------
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CONSEQUENCES  THAT  CAN  RESULT  FROM  THE  CHANGING  TRANSATLANTIC 
PERCEPTIONS  OF  THE  WORLD  THAT  I  HAVE  EARLIER  DESCRIBED.  EITHER 
TENDENCY.  BY  ITSELF.  CAN  BE  D~FFICULT ENOUGH  TO  COUNTERa  BOTH, 
MOVING  TOGETHER.  EACH  EXACERBATING  THE  OTHER,  COULD  PROVE  TO  BE 
A WICKED  BREW  INDEED. 
THIS  ABSORPTION  WITH  ITS  INTERNAL  CONCERNS  IS  IN  GREAT 
~"EASURE A CONSEOUENCE  OF  CURRENT  ECONO"IC  CONDITIONS  IN  [UROPE, 
AND  THEREFORE  HOPEFULLY  WILL  DIMINISH  AS  PROSPERITY  RETURNS. 
BUT  THE  TENDENCY  TO  LAY  THE  BLAME  FOR  RECESSION  LARGELY  AT  THE 
DOOR  Of  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  OU~ HIGH  INTEREST  RATES  PRESENTS 
'  ANOTHER  KINO  OF  PROBLEM.  WHAT  MUST  BE  AVOIDED  IN  THIS 
TRANSATLANTIC  DIALOGUE  OVER  ECONOMIC  ISSUES  IS  A TOO  FACILE 
RESORT  TO  THE  •BLAME  AMERICA  FIRST•  SYNDROME.  FOR  TO  DO  SO  IS 
TO  OBSCURE  MORE  ~NDAMENTAL FAILINGS  THAT  STAND  IN  THE  WAY  Of 
ECONOMlC  RECOVERY.  IN  THE  END,  EUROPEANS,  POSSESSING 
COLLECTIVELY  A GROSS  NATIONAL  PRODUCT  LARGER  THAN  THAT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES,  NEED  TO  ASK  THEMSELVES  WHETHER  IT  CAN  REALLY  BE 
TRUE  THAT  THEIR  ECONOMIC  RECOVERY  DEPENDS,  IN  THE  MAIN.  ON  THE 
PRIME  RATE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES. 
• • • • • 
I  HAVE  CITED  TH~SE  PROBLEMS  BECAUSE  I  DEEPLY  BELIEVE  THEY 
NEED  TO  BE  DISCUSSED  BETWEEN  FRIENDS  WHILE  THEY  ARE  STILL - 16  -
"ANAGEABLE  ISSUES.  I  DO  NOT  BELIEVE  THEY  DE"ONSTRATE  A 
FUNDAMENTAL  RIFT  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  SIDES  OF  THE  ATLANTIC.  ~OR  DO 
I  BELIEVE  THEY  ARE  INSUR"OUNTABLE.  IN  FACT,  THE  "AHNER  IN 
WHICH  WE  WERE  ABLE,  TOGETHER,  TO  PUT  OUR  DISAGRE~MENT OVER 
PIPELINE  SANCTIONS  BEHIND  US  DEMONSTRATES  THE  CONTRARY. 
RATHER,  I  CITE  THEM  BECAUSE  I  FEAR  THAT  LEFT  UNCHECKED,  THESE 
TRENDS~  PLUS  OUR  OWN  INCREASING  CONCERN  WITH  OUR  AFFAIRS  IN 
OTHER  PARTS  OF  THE  WORLD-- CENTRAL  AMERICA,  THE·PACIFIC,  THE 
MIDDLE  EAST,  TO  NAME  BUT  A FEW-- CAN,  OVER  TIME,  DIMINISH  THE 
CHARACTER  OF  THE  TRANSATLANTIC  RELATIONSHIP.  AND  THAT  WOULD  BE 
A TRAGEDY,  FOR  A STRONG  ALLIANCE  IS  NOW,  AND  WILL  CONTINUE  TO 
BE  FOR  DECADES  TO  COHE,  THE  KEYSTONE  ~F OUR  OWN  -- AND  THE 
WEST'S  -- SECURITY  AND  STABILITY. 
THUS,  NOW  "AY  WELL  BE  THE  APPROPRIATE  "OHENT  FOR  All  OF  US 
EUROPEANS  AND  ~ERICANS -- TO  TAKE  A NEW  LOOK  AT  WHERE  WE 
SHOULD  BE  GOING  TOGETHER  AND  HOW  WE  SHOULD  6ET  THERE.  PERHAPS, 
AS  WAS  RECENTLY  INDICATED  IN  THE  WALL  STREET  JOURNAL,  WE"  MIGHT 
FOREGO  THE  TRADITIONAL  CHOICES  BETWEEN  LESS  AND  MORE 
INVOLVEMENT,  AND  DIRECT  OURSELVES  INSTEAD  TO  A •sMARTER• 
INVOLVEMENT.  THE  TWO  PILLARS  OF  A •sMARTER•  RELATIONSHIP,  IN 
MY  OPINION,  ARE: 
((  -- INCREASING  RESPECT  FOR  THE  DIFFERENCES  IN  OUR 
~  ALLIANCE~ANO, .  '  .. 
. ' 
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A "~E COORDINATED  APPROACH  -- ACROSS  THE  BOARD  -- TO  'l  All  POLITICAL,  ECONO"IC  AND  SECURITY  ISSUES  WITH  OUR  [UROPEAN 
ALLIES. 
• • • • • 
I  WILL  BE  THE  FIRST  TO  ADMIT  THAT  I  HAVE  NO  MAGIC  FORMULA 
FOR  RESOLVING  THE  STRAINS  THAT  WILL  SURELY  BEAR  DOWN  ON  ALL  or 
US  IN  THE  COMING  DECADES.  BUT  I  DO  BELIEVE  THAT  BEGINNING  THE 
DIAiOGUE  IS  THE  KEY  TO  THE  EVENTUAL  DISCOVERY  or  ANSWERS.  THE 
AGENDA  MUST  BE  BROAD:  THE  FORA  IN\WHICH  THAT  AGENDA  COULD  BE 
DISCUSSED  ARE  MANY.  AND  IF  I  WERE  ASKED  TO  SUGGEST  SOME  OF  THE 
SUBJECTS  THAT  "IGHT  BE  CONSIDERED  I  WOULD  PROPOSE: 
\ 
fiRST:  HOW  CAN  WE  ENHANCE  TRANSATLANTIC  COOPERATION 
· \  IN  THE.DEVELOPftENT  OF  HI6H  T£CHNOL06Y?  PAINFUL  AND 
COSTLY  AS  IT  "AY  BE,  WE  "UST  RECOGNIZE  THAT  IF 
ANY  PART  or  OUR  ALLIANCE  LAGS  SERIOUSLY  BEHIND 
ANOTHER  IN  THIS  FIELD  FOR  ANY  PERIOD  OF  TIME,  IT 
WILL  SERIOUSLY  DIMINISH  OUR  OVERALL  EFFECTIVENSS. 
\1 
SECONP:  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  MOVING  NOW  TO  THE 
BROADENING  or  ALLIANCE  DEFENSE  PROCUREMENT  POLICIES. 
THE  UNITED  STATES  -- PARTICULARLY  THE  CONGRESS  --
HAS,  fOR  TOO  LONG,  ASKED  ITS  ALLIES  TO  SHARE  MORE . ·  .. 
. .  . 
----- --------------------
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Of  THE  BURDEN  OF  THE  CO"MON  DEFENSE  WITHOUT,  AT  THE 
SAME  TIME,  RECOGNIZING  THAT  EUROPEAN  INDUSTRY  "UST, 
If THIS  IS  TO  BE  THE  CASE,  PARTICIPATE  FULLY  IN  THE 
MANUFACTURE  OF  DEFENSE  ITEMS. 
THIRD:  HOW  CAN  THE  DEVELOPED  WORLD  COPE  "ORE 
EFFECTIVELY  WITH  THE  LARGE,  URGENT,  AND  AS  YET 
UNMANAGEABLE  QUESTIONS  Of  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE 
LOC's? 
fOURTH:  HOW  CAN  WE  OVERCOME  THE  INCRiASING  PRESSURES 
TOWARD  PROTECTIONISM  ON  BOTH  SIDES  Of  THE  ATLANTIC 
AND  IN  JAPAN?  MORE  CONSTRUCTIVELY,  HOW  CAN  THE 
WORLn's  MAJOR  TRADING  NATIONS  REDUCE  THE  BARRIERS 
TO  A FREER  TRADE  BETWEEN  US? 
THESE  ARE  BUT  A FEW  Of  THE  MANY  QUESTIONS  THAT  WE  SHOULD 
BE  WORKING  JOINTLY.  BUT  WHATEVER  OUR  AGENDA,  ITS  PURPOSE  OUGHT 
TO  BE  TO  BRING  THE  TWO  SIDES  OF  THE  PARTNERSHIP  TOGETHER  TO 
RESOLVE  PROBLEMS,  REVERSE  TRENDS  THAT  LEFT  UNCHECKED  WILL  PULL 
US  APART,  AND  -- IN  THE  LAST  ANALYSIS  --MOVE  BOTH  SIDES  OF  THE 
ATLANTIC  TOWARD  GREATER  EQUALITY  OF  EFFORT,  OUTLOOK,  AND 
STRENGTH.  To  QUOTE  AGAIN  FROM  THE  WALL  STREET  JOURNAl,  •A 
GENUINE  SUPERPOWER  DOESN'T  NEED  HEGEMONIC  INFLUENCE  WITH  A WEAK 
SET  OF  CLIENT  STATES,  BUT  A TRUE  ALLIANCE  WITH  OTHER  GREAT 
NATIONs.• 
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